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EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS
OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Kristin N. Johnson* and Carla L. Reyes**
Abstract: Emerging technologies promise to play a transformative role
in our society, enabling driverless cars, enhanced accuracy and efficiency
in disease mapping, greater and less expensive access to certain consumer

services, including consumer financial services. Discussions regarding the
role of emerging technologies increasingly center on the development and
integration of artificial intelligence technologies or AI-an assemblage of
technologies that rely on a variety of computational techniques. This Essay
offers a modest primer outlining a general understanding of the contours and
contributions of Al, as well as introducing the articulated benefits and limits
of these technologies.
This Essay examines the increasingly pervasive use of artificial intelligence
in society through two key areas of ethical and policy concerns: (i) privacy,
surveillance and the appropriate boundaries for machine-human interaction,
and (ii) bias and discrimination. As we assess the merits of Al, this Essay
embraces the robust and lively debate and raises probing questions initiated
by scholars, activists, industry participants, and governments regarding the

ethical implications of embracing Al. This Essay encourages adopters of
Al to carefully consider the impacts of integrating Al on vulnerable and
marginalized groups. To accomplish this goal, this Essay advocates for
affected stakeholders to engage in a collaborative, interdisciplinary colloquy
examining the consequences of incorporating Al technologies.

Finally, this Essay serves as an introduction to a Special Issue dedicated to
sharing novel thinking and approaches to address underexplored challenges
posed by Al. Addressing a range of issues discussed in the debate regarding
the promises and perils of Al, the contributors to this volume offer critical
insights, frameworks, and tools for evaluating the issues from the perspectives
of diverse stakeholders. This Special Issue seeks to shed light on some of the
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hidden implications of artificial intelligence on the values, institutions, and
structures that form the foundation of a just society.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, ethics, values, policy framework, privacy,
bias

I.

Introduction

-

On March 11, 2021, the Director-General of the World Health Organization issued
a statement confirming that more than one hundred thousand individuals in more
than one hundred countries had contracted COVID-19.' The somber statement
acknowledged a grim fact-reports indicated evidence of more than four thousand
deaths associated with transmission of the virus.2 Responding to alarm regarding
the rapid transmission and severity of the virus, the Director-General acknowledged that "[t]housands more [were] fighting for their lives in hospitals." 3 In a foreboding tone, the announcement warned that epidemiologists expected the number
of cases, the number of deaths, and the number of affected countries to climb even
higher" in the coming days, weeks, and months.
In the statement, a single, transformative sentence-fourteen words 4
marked a historic moment in local, national, and international governance, the
global economy, and the lives of citizens in nations around the world. Within

1 This Article refers to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 as "SARS-CoV-2," "COVID19," the "coronavirus" and the "virus." This Article uses each of these terms to describe the disease and
uses the terms interchangeably.
2 Director-General of the World Health Organization, WHO Director-General'sopening remarks at
the media briefing on COVID-19-11 March 2020, (11 March 2020) <https://www.who.int/director-

general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020> (visited 14 October 2021) ("We have therefore made the assessment that
COVID-19 canbecharacterized asapandemic."); CenterforDisease ControlandPrevention, "FirstTravelRelated Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Detected in United States," CDC Newsroom (21 January
2020) <https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0121-novel-coronavirus-travel-case.html
(visited
14 October 2021).
3 Director-General of the World Health Organization, WHO Director-General'sopening remarks at
the media briefing on COVID-19-11 March 2020, (11 March 2020) <https://www.who.int/director-

general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19--11-march-2020> (visited 14 October 2021).
4 More specifically, the statement indicated the World Health Organization's determination that transmission rate COVID-19 and other conditions established that the disease met criteria for classification as
a "pandemic." A pandemic is defined as an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area,
crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people. WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19-11 March 2020, (n. 2). While there were
still a number of questions regarding the virus transmission rate, a number of countries confirmed
rapidly increasingly and significant numbers of cases. On January 21, 2020, the Center for Disease
Control announced the first confirmed case of the coronavirus in the United States in the State of Washington. First Travel-related Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Detected in United States. By March 31,
2020, there were more than 10,000 confirmed cases in the United States and more than 750,000 confirmed cases globally. World Health Organization, CoronavirusDisease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation
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weeks, countries around the world witnessed exponential growth in the number
of confirmed cases.5 A deluge of critically-ill patients inundated short-staffed and
undersupplied emergency rooms. 6 Teeming with patients, intensive care units
spilled into hospital hallways;7 COVID-19 related deaths paralyzed emergency

and mortuary services.8
In parallel to the exponential rise in confirmed COVID-19 cases, scientists,
epidemiologists, researchers, and technologists accelerated efforts to integrate artificial intelligence ("AI") 9 in each phase of disease transmission mitigation. 0 These
professionals adopted and adapted artificial intelligence-oriented technologies to
assist in the expedited development of therapeutic treatments, clinical vaccine
trials, and diverse testing methodologies." Using Al to leverage existing technology altered the pace of COVID-19 disease mitigation campaigns adopted by
governments, employers, and private institutions. 2 Alongside these developments,
Al enabled the aggregation of data streams generated by community testing dashboards, digital thermometers, thermal cameras, programmable cleaning or disinfecting robots, and web-based toolkits that measured the allocation and distribution

Report - 71, Mar 31, 2021, (31 March 2021) <https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/

situation-reports/20200331-sitrep-71-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=4360e92b_8> (visited 14 October 2021).
5 See Pam Belluck and Noah Weiland, "C.D.C. Officials Warn of Coronavirus Outbreaks in the U.S.,"
New York Times (9 March 2020).
6 Jay Reeves, "Patients Lying In Hallways, Nurses Working Extra Shifts: As Coronavirus Surges In Some
US States, Emergency Rooms Are Being Swamped," Chicago Tribune (18 July 2020) (explaining that
"[p]atients struggling to breathe are being placed onventilators in emergency wards since intensive care
units are full").

7 Ibid.
8 Shalini Ramachandran, "Coronavirus Cases Strain New York City Hospitals: 'We're Getting
Pounded,"' Wall Street Journal (20 March 2020); Michael R. Sisak and Robert Bumstead, "Surge in
Deaths Overwhelms New York's Morgues and Hospitals," NPR Newshour (21 March 2020) <https://
www.pbs.org/newshour/health/surge-in-deaths-overwhelms-new-yorks-morgues-hospitals> (visited 14
October 2020) (indicating that sudden surge of deaths in New York hospitals in February and March
prompted The Federal Emergency Management Agency to sends refrigerated trucks to serve as temporary morgues).

9 The term Al refers to a "broad assemblage of technologies" that deploys computerized algorithms
designed to-among other tasks-aggregate large volumes of data, identify and predict patterns in the
data, and, according to proponents, replicate human reasoning and cognitive abilities.
10 Forexamples see "CheckYour Symptoms forCOVID-19 Online,"MASS.GOV,<https://www.mass.gov/
how-to/check-your-symptoms-for-covid-19-online> (visited 15 October 2021) (an online platform users
can use to assess possible symptoms of COVID-19) and World Health Organization, DigitalTools For
COVID-19 Contact Tracing, 2 June 2020) <https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/332265/
WHO-2019-nCoV-Contact_Tracing-ToolsAnnex-2020.1-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (visited 15 October 2021).
11 See Shantanu Nundy & Kavita K. Patel, "Self-Service Diagnosis of COVID-19-Ready for Prime
Time?," JAMA Network: JAMA Health (16 March 2020) <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamahealth-forum/fullarticle/2763264> (visited 15 October 2021) and Chris Stokel-Walker, "Can Mobile
Contact-Tracing Apps Help Lift Lockdown?," BBC: Future (15 April 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/
future/article/20200415-covid-19-could-bluetooth-contact-tracing-end-lockdown-early>
(visited 15
October 2021).
12 See, e.g., "Coronavirus (COVID-19) Resources for Schools," Maine departmentofEduucation, https://
www.maine.gov/doe/covid-19 (visited 16 August 2020).
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of personal protective equipment and vaccines. 3 Moreover, Al facilitated novel
digital contact tracing apps.14 The adoption of innovative disease mitigation tech-

nologies in response to the coronavirus pandemic revealed entreched inequalities in
access to healthcare and disheartening disparities in access to other resources and
as well as the protections of well-established rights, such as privacy protections.
Enthusiasts declare that Al is no longer a matter of science fiction and contend
that recent events offer an apt illustration of the promise of nascent adaptations of
sophisticated algorithmic systems, programs, and protocols. Proponents point to

the integration of Al in pandemic responses as evidence of its social, economic, and
public health (as well as many other) benefits. And, indisputably, algorithms have
long-occupied a central role in sophisticated modeling in the mathematics, computer science, and finance disciplines as well as diverse public and private institutions including research laboratories, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, health
care services businesses, raw materials supply chains, and agricultural, energy, and
manufacturing firms. The development of supercomputers and AI-driven programs

and protocols incorporated in popular apps, personal devices, and widely-adopted
software programs contributes to the continued proliferation of Al.
Increasingly pervasive and arguably ubiquitous, AI-powered platforms per-

form important gatekeeping functions, including: assessing strategic plans for the
production, distribution and consumption of food and energy, determining access
to critical government services," influencing policies, processes, and procedures
related to policing in our communities,1 6 establishing the contours of consumer

13 Ibid.

14 John R. Quain, "Can Your Phone Tell You if You've Been Exposed to COVID-19?," AARP: Personal
Technology (updated 17 December 2020) <https://www.aarp.org/home-family/personal-technology/
info-2020/coronavirus-exposure-notification-apps.html> (visited 15 October 2021).
15 For detailed discussions of a variety of government-citizen interactions to which state and federal governmental institutions apply algorithms and other methods of artificial intelligence, see, for example,
Danielle Keats Citron, "Technological Due Process" (2008) 85:6 Washington University Law Review
1249, 1252, 1259 (examining the use of technology in administrative law); Andrea Roth, "Trial by
Machine" (2016) 104:5 Georgetown Law Journal 1245, 1296-98 (exploring use of technology in
criminal adjudication); Margaret Hu, "Algorithmic Jim Crow" (2017) 86:2 FordhamLaw Review 633,
637-38, 672, 679, 682-84 (examining immigration and national security contexts); and Rebecca Wexler, "Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System" (2018) 70:5
Stanford Law Review 1343, 1346-48 (exploring the automation of the criminal justice system).
16 See, e.g., Andrew D. Selbst, "Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing" (2017) 52:1 GeorgiaLaw Review
109, 113 (examining the use of data mining in policing); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, "Policing Predictive Policing" (2017) 94:5 Washington University Law Review 1109, 1112-13; Elizabeth E. Joh, "Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment" (2014) 89:1 Washington Law Review 35, 35;
Elizabeth E. Joh "The Consequences of Automating and Deskilling the Police" (2019) 67 UCLA Law
Review Discourse 133, 136-37; Sandra G. Mayson, "Bias In, Bias Out" (2019) 128:8 Yale Law Journal
2218, 2222; Megan Stevenson, "Assessing Risk Assessment in Action" (2018) 103:1 Minnesota Law
Review 303, 307 (pre-trial risk assessment); Erin Collins, "Punishing Risk" (2018) 107:1 Georgetown
Law Journal 57, 59-60 (actuarial sentencing); Jessica M. Eaglin, "Constructing Recidivism Risk"
(2017) 67:1 Emory Law Journal59, 61; Ric Simmons "Big Data, Machine Judges, and the Legitimacy
of the Criminal Justice System," (2018) 52:2 U.C. Davis Law Review 1067, 1072.
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and even permeating the most intimate private

8

World leaders increasingly acknowledge the salience and continuous evolution of Al. In response, many propose integrating Al as a central component in the
global policy agenda.1 9 As society places increasing importance on the potential

efficiency, accuracy, and speed enabled by Al, the technological shift introduces
urgent questions regarding the relationship between long-established values relating to ethics, equity, and inclusion. The adoption of Al in social, economic, and
governance contexts challenges existing understandings of relationships, obligations, access, and opportunities and important and universally recognized rights.

Setting aside the complexity of the technology and the arguably impenetrable jargon, novice readers may justifiably find the debate on the merits of Al dizzying.
The arguments in favor of Al and those seeking to ensure that embedded values are
consistent with or advancing adopted norms often point to the same technology as
producing antithetical outcomes.20 When assessing these technologies, advocates
may contend AI reduces the likelihood of human bias or prejudice because platforms
rely on neutral data and machine learning-which they argue is free from human
bias-to process the data.2 ' At the same time critics argue that Al compounds and
reinforces historically entrenched biases and inequalities because the design of Al
systems and even the data may reflect embedded biases.22 As Rashida Richardson

17 For scholarly discussion of the ways that private entities use artificial intelligence, and the ways that
they may add bias to their decisions when doing so, see, for example, Danielle Keats Citron & Frank
Pasquale, "The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions" (2014) 89:1 Washington Law
Review 1, 4-5, 13-14; Kristin Johnson et al., "Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in
Finance: Toward Responsible Innovation," (2019) 88:2 Fordham Law Review 499, 500-01, 504-05;
Kristin N. Johnson, "Automating the Risk of Bias" (2019) 87:5 George Washington Law Review 1214,
1215, 1220; Matthew Adam Bruckner, "The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders' Use of Big
Data" (2018) 93:1 Chicago-Kent Law Review 3, 5-6, 25-26; Matthew Adam Bruckner, "Preventing
Predation & Encouraging Innovation in Fintech Lending," (2018) 72 Consumer FinancialLaw Quarterly Report 370, 377-80.

18 Surya Mattu & Kashmir Hill, "The House that Spied on Me," Gizmodo, (7 February 2018) <https://
gizmodo.com/the-house-that-spied-on-me-1822429852> (visited 7 October 2018).
19 Ryan Tracy, "U.S. Launches Task Force to Study Opening Government Data for Al Research," Wall
Street Journal (10 June, 2021) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-launches-task-force-to-open-govern
ment-data-for-ai-research-11623344400> (visited 11 October 2021).
20 For an important discussion regarding the potential for Al to embed values see Harry Surden, "Values
Embedded in Legal Artipcial Intelligence (13 March 2017) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932333> or
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2932333> (visited 14 October 2021). Surden explains, Technological
systems can have values embedded in their design. This means that certain technologies, when used,
can have the effect of promoting or inhibiting particular societal values over others. Although sometimes the embedding ofvalues is intentional, often it is unintentional and, in either case, when it occurs
it can be difficult to observe or detect. The embedding of values in technological systems becomes
increasingly significant when these systems are used in the application of law. Ibid.
21 See Mirko Bagaric & Gabrielle Wolf, Sentencing by Computer (n. 6), p. 654.
22 See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst "Big Data's Disparate Impact" (2016) 104:3 California
Law Review 671; Harry Surden, "Ethics of Al in Law: Basic Questions," in Markus D. Dubber, et al.
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Ethics ofArtifcial Intelligence 719 (Oxford: UK, Oxford University
Press, 2020); Amanda Levendowski, "How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence's Implicit
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explains, the data that programmers perceive to be neutral may reflect biases based
on the collection, cleaning, processing, and integration of the data or broader social
inequalities that influence practices and policies that may lead to overrepresentation of marginalized subjects in certain contexts or the underrepresentation of the
same data subjects in other contexts.2 3

According to proponents who seek to expand the reach of artificial intelligence
in society, Al relies on machines, eliminating or reducing the role of humans (limited by cognitive biases). Consequently, proponents argue, Al reduces the threat
of discrimination.24 Others focus on the potential of Al and automation to improve
society through cost savings and efficiencies.25 Meanwhile, skeptical scholars,
activists, commentators, legislatures, judges, and regulators offer compelling evidence that challenges these claims and underscores the underexplored impact that
these technologies may have on marginalized communities. Simply stated, critics
argue, achieving the promise of Al may engender benefits; yet, on balance, it may
also result in technology that embeds or replicates concerning values or displaces
established, central protections for members of vulnerable groups. In other words,
in a just society, we may seek to affirm that Al is, in fact, beneficial; but the inquiry

would not end there, as this conclusion merely begs the question-beneficial for
whom?
The debate prompts probing questions regarding the ethical implications

of embracing Al and encourages adopters, government authorities, and affected
stakeholders to engage in a collaborative, interdisciplinary colloquy examining
the consequences of incorporating Al technologies. To that end, this Special Issue
encourages an even-handed, yet comprehensive assessment of Al, with emphasis on a few identified challenges. The contributions introduce novel thinking
and approaches to address some of the underexplored challenges posed by Al. 26

Bias Problem" (2018) 93:2 Washington Law Review 579; Sonia K. Katyal, "Private Accountability in
the Age of Artificial Intelligence," (2019) 66:1 UCLA Law Review 54.
23 Rashida Richardson, Jason Schultz and Kate Crawford, "Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights
Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice" (2019) 94 New York University Law Review Online 192.

24 See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Gabrielle Wolf, "Sentencing by Computer: Enhancing Sentencing Transparency and Predictability, and (Possibly) Bridging the Gap Between Sentencing Knowledge and Practice"
(2018) 25:3 George Mason Law Review 653, 654 ("This Article concludes that [alleged bias] problems
can be overcome and that computers could determine sentences more effectively and fairly than human
judges. The application of a properly designed algorithm that incorporates all relevant sentencing variables and confers appropriate weight on sentencing objectives and considerations could lead to sentences
that are transparent and fair.").
25 John O. McGinnis & Russel G. Pearce, "The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services" (2014) 82:6 Fordham Law Review 3041,
3064.
26 Concerns about privacy, surveillance, bias, discrimination and the boundaries of machine-human interaction are not new. This Special Issue seeks to add to the existing scholarly discussion by purposefully
integrating interdisciplinary voices, connecting international threads, and putting underexplored concerns and populations in the forefront of the discussion For a deeper dive into some of the existing
scholarly discussion of these issues, see, e.g., Sherley E. Cruz, "Coding for Cultural Competency:
Expanding Access to Justice with Technology" (2019) 86:2 Tennessee Law Review 347, 350; Shoshana
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Specifically, the contributions in this Special Issue discuss important methods of
assessing these technologies. Addressing a range of issues discussed in the debate
regarding the promises and perils of Al, the contributors to this volume offer critical insights, frameworks, and tools for evaluating the issues from the perspectives of diverse stakeholders. Indeed, the contributors move the literature forward
towards tangible policy approaches that can mitigate harm from existing uses of
artificial intelligence.
Ultimately, this Special Issue seeks to shed light on some of the hidden implications of artificial intelligence on the values, institutions, and structures that form
the foundation of a just society. To that end, the Special Issue examines the increasingly pervasive use of artificial intelligence in society through two key areas of ethical and policy concerns: (i) privacy, surveillance and the appropriate boundaries
for machine-human interaction, and (ii) bias and discrimination. In this introductory Essay, we briefly examine the core questions that motivated this Special Issue
in each of these areas and then outline each contribution's response, highlighting
the advocacy undertaken by the authors on behalf of voices that traditionally experience marginalization in artificial intelligence and law discussions.

II.

Understanding Algorithms, AT, and Machine Learning

At the most general level, the term Al refers to "a set of techniques aimed at
approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition" relying on a system

of algorithms to simulate human learning and a machine to execute the correlated
activity.27 Aside from this general sketch, a generally agreed-upon definition of
Al remains elusive.28 Instead, the term Al refers to a large set of information or
computer sciences. 29 Professor Harry Surden points out, "[h]owever, Al is truly
an interdisciplinary enterprise that incorporates ideas, techniques, and researchers
from multiple fields, including statistics, linguistics, robotics, electrical engineering, mathematics, neuroscience, economics, logic, and philosophy, to name just a
few." 30 Irrespective of the definitional difficulty surrounding the term "Al," recent
advances in computer processing speed, algorithms, and the rise of big data have

Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fightfor a Human Future at the New Frontier of

Power (New York: New York, Public Affairs, 2019), Carla L. Reyes & Jeff Ward, "Digging into Algorithms: Legal Ethics and Legal Access" (2020) 21:1 Nevada Law Journal325.
27 Ryan Calo, "Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap" (2017) 51:2 U.C. DavisLaw Review
399, 404.
28 Ibid. at 403-04; see also Matthew U. Scherer, "Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies" (2016) 29:2 HarvardJournal of Law & Technology 353, 359
("Unfortunately, there does not yet appear to be any widely accepted definition of artificial intelligence
even among experts in the field, much less a useful working definition for the purposes of regulation.").
29 M. Tim Jones, Artifcial Intelligence:A SystemsApproach 5 (Hingham: Massachusetts, Infinity Science
Press LLC, 2008); Harry Surden, "Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview" (2019) 35:4 Georgia
State University Law Review 1305, 1310.
30 Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and the Law (n. 20), p. 1310.
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made machine learning the most popularly known Al technique.3' In machine learning, computers compute data 2 using an algorithm to perform an assigned objective
function, 33 make predictions,3 4 and automate certain tasks.35

Machine learning algorithms can rely on a variety of computational techniques, including supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning. 36 In super-

vised learning, "the algorithm is given inputs and desired outputs with the goal
of learning which rules lead to the desired outputs." 37 In unsupervised learning,
"the learning algorithm is left on its own to determine the relationships within a
dataset." 38 Reinforcement learning, for its part, involves providing feedback to the
algorithm regarding how well it makes connections between inputs and outputs as
the algorithm navigates the dataset. 39 Upon discovering patterns, machine learning
can be programmed to apply these patterns to predict future outcomes. 40 However,

as used in this context, the word "learning" does not refer to "the more holistic
concept referred to when people speak of human learning." 4' Indeed, "machine
learning does not require a computer to engage in higher-order cognitive skills like
reasoning or understanding of abstract concepts." 4 2 This leaves Al methods vulnerable to underperforming values-centered analysis that focuses on principles such as
equity, justice, transparency, and ethics. As a result, the increasing pervasiveness of
Al throughout society gives rise to new concerns about the implications of Al for
a just society.

Al promises to be more efficient and effective, and less biased than humans
in making data-driven, accurate decisions. However, evidence demonstrates that
Al may not always live up to this promise. For example, biases can be encoded in

31 Carla L. Reyes "Autonomous Business Reality" (2021) 21:2 Nevada Law Review 437, 449-50.
32 Michael Simon et al., "Lola v. Skadden and the Automation of the Legal Profession" (2018) 20 Yale
JournalofLaw and Technology 234, 254.

33

Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, "Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the
Machine-Learning Era" (2017) 105:5 Georgetown Law Journal 1147, 1157 (explaining that machine
learning algorithms "'optimize a performance criterion using example data or past experience.' In other
words, these algorithms make repeated passes through data sets, progressively modifying or averaging
their predictions to optimize specified criteria." (footnote omitted) (quoting Ethem Alpaydin, Introduction to Machine Learning3 (Cambridge: Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2d ed., 2010)).
34 Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artifcial Intelligence's Implicit Bias Problem (n.
17), p. 590-91.
35 Ryan Calo, Artipcial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap (n. 18), p. 405; Harry Surden,
"Machine Learning and Law" (2014) 89:1 Washington Law Review 87, 88.
36 See generallyEthem Alpaydin, Introduction to Machine Learning (n. 28).

37 Simon, et. al., Lola v. Skadden and the Automation of the Legal Profession (n. 23), p. 254 (citing Stuart
J. Russell & PeterNorvig, ArtifcialIntelligence:A ModernApproach 650 (Prentice Hall, 2d ed. 2009)).
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Kevin P. Murphy, Machine Learning: A ProbabilisticPerspective 1-24 (Cambridge: Massachusetts,

MIT Press, 2012).
41 Michael L. Rich, "Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment"
(2016) 164:4 University ofPennsylvaniaLaw Review 871, 880.
42 Ibid.
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the datasets on which machine learning algorithms are trained. 43 One of machine

learning's core dilemmas, therefore, centers on how to map inputs to outputs with
a high degree of accuracy, but without also producing discriminatory classifications. As a result, although many believe that the advances in machine learning
and other sophisticated emerging technologies "have the potential to help address
some of the biggest challenges that society faces," 44 that potential also raises the
challenge of ensuring AI's equitable development and ethical use. 4 5 The contributions to this Special Issue create an important dialogue around whether and how
law can nudge society toward more equitable and ethical design and use of Al,
rather than allowing Al to nudge core societal values towards what is technologically convenient.

III.

Privacy, Surveillance, and the Changing Nature of
Machine-Human Interaction

Because Al relies on enormous amounts of data, issues of privacy and surveillance
take on heightened priority. Scholars increasingly point out the dual-edged sword
presented by Al: each potential use has as much power to harm as to benefit society. 46 And because Al tools improve performance as they acquire additional data, 47
"Al exacerbates and exponentially multiplies the existing trends to over collect
data and use data for unintended purposes not disclosed to users at the time of collection."48 As Al models improve, they draw increasingly accurate but non-intuitive
and unverifiable inferences about individuals that "create new opportunities for discriminatory, biased, and privacy-invasive profiling and decision-making." 49 Thus,
as lawmakers and regulators place increased scrutiny on the methods used to obtain
the data that fuels Al, a third issue is drawn to the foreground-namely, the changing nature of machine-human interaction.

43

See Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix ArtipcialIntelligence' Implicit Bias Problem
(n. 17).
44 Executive Office ofthe Presidentnational Science and Technology Council Commission on Technology,
Preparingfor the Future ofArtipcial Intelligence 5 (2016).
45 Carla L Reyes & Jeff Ward, Digging into Algorithms (n. 15), p. 333.

46 Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, "Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy" (2019) 21
Yale Journal of Law & Technology 106, 121-127 (discussing the darker side of data collection and
analytics, and arguing that AI threatens privacy).
47 Ibid., p. 121-122 ("The more data the higher the quality of your learned algorithm will be. The more
variables or features, the more complex and potentially accurate the model can be. Thus the companies
that succeed will be the ones not with the best algorithm, but with access to the best data. The more data
collected the smarter, faster and more accurate the algorithms will be.").
48 Ibid., p. 121.

49 Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, "A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection
Law in the Age of Big Data and AI" (2019) 2019:2 Columbia Business Law Review 1, 4.
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People increasingly rely on machines in every aspect of their lives. 50 Those
machines collect data, not all of which is obvious to the person who purchased and
used the machine." Further, the data collected, including important and revealing metadata,5 2 is often sold without the knowledge of the data subject.53 In this

way, the increased prevalence of machine-human interaction directly intertwines
with AI-related privacy and surveillance concerns. The increased prevalence of
machines in society also, however, changes the nature of machine-human interaction in both subtle and not-so-subtle ways. For example, children begin interacting with technology, including algorithms and Al earlier than generations past. 4
Some of machine-child interactions benefit learning,55 while others threaten mental health56 and expose children to new forms of bullying and abuse.57 Companies
require employees to use machines in new or more frequent ways,58 or replace

employees with machines altogether.59 Consumer reliance on machine-based, or
AI-fueled tools has shifted entire industries.60 Each of these AI-driven changes
raises new challenges to the existing legal framework.
The legal services industry offers a core example of the challenges to the existing legal framework posed by the changing nature of machine-human interaction.

50 Surya Mattu & Kashmir Hill, The House that Spied on Me (n. 8); Charlotte A. Tschider, "Regulating the
Internet of Things: Discrimination, Privacy, and Cybersecurity in the Artificial Intelligence Age" (2018)
96:1 Denver Law Review 87, 90-91.

51 Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences, (n. 58), p. 4.
52 Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy (n. 55), p. 108
("Millions of terabytes of data about the real world and its inhabitants are generated each dat. Much of
that is noise with little apparent meaning. The goal of AI is to filter the noise, find meaning, and act upon
it, ultimately with greater precision and better outcomes than humans can achieve on their own.").
53 Ibid, pp. 118-119.
54 Eldar Haber, "The Internet of Children: Protecting Children's Privacy in A Hyper-Connected World"
(2020) 2020:4 University of Illinois Law Review 1209; Stephen Balkam, "Children Privacy, and the
New Online Realities," in Evan Selinger, et. al. (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consumer Privacy
(Cambridge: Massachusetts, Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 245 ("The reality is that kids are
already on the Internet. There are tablets for two-year-olds. There are potty training apps and iPad holders for baby strollers.").
55 Children, Privacy, and the New Online Realities (n. 59), p. 245 ("Increasing numbers of children in
elementary and middle school are either provided with or assumed to have a tablet or laptop for work
in class or at home.").
56 Ibid., p. 246 (describing research that finds AI-power toys can be "'toxic' and detrimental to a child's
emerging ability to converse and make sense of the world.").
57 Michael Laubscher & Willie van Vollenhoven, "Cyberbullying: Should Schools Choose between
Safety and Privacy?" (2015) 18:6 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal; Jacob Tabor, "Students'
First Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet: Off-Campus Cyberspeech and School Regulation"
(2009) 50:2 Boston College Law Review 561.
58 See Adam D. Moore, "Employee Monitoring: Evaluative Surveillance v. Privacy" (2020) 10 Business
Ethics Quarterly 697; Cynthia Estlund, "What Should We do After Work? Automation and Employment Law" (2018) 128:2 Yale Law Journal254.
59 See Cynthia Estlund, What Should We do After Work? (n. 63); Ewan McGaughey, "Will Robots Automate Your Job Away? Full Employment, Basic Income and Economic Democracy" (2021) Industrial
Law Journal.

60 See, e.g., Daniel Gabay, "Sears'Bankruptcy Underscores the Need for Tech Innovation in Retail" The
Next Web (24 February 2019) <https://thenextweb.com/news/sears-bankruptcy-underscores-the-needfor-tech-innovation-in-retail> (visited 11 October 2021).
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In the face of increasing price pressures from clients, 61 the legal industry increasingly turns to the use of legal technology powered by artificial intelligence to
increase efficiencies and cabin costs.6 2 Doing so requires attorneys to navigate a

difficult landscape of new machine-human interaction. Understanding an attorney's
duties under the rules of professional conduct in this changing legal practice landscape can pose thorny issues. 63 One particularly controversial issue is where to
draw the line between a lawyer's use of artificial intelligence in the practice of law
and the unauthorized practice of law by artificial intelligence. 64 The resolution of
this issue impacts efforts to increase access to justice using technology 65 and core
questions around the appropriate work conditions for an emerging class of contract
attorneys.66

For example, David Lola challenged what he called the exploitative work conditions under which he was employed as a contract attorney involved in "document
review projects that do not in any way resemble the practice of law." 67 Although
Mr. Lola lost at the trial court level, 68 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ultimately ruled that Mr. Lola was entitled to overtime pay because
only those practicing law can be denied overtime, and "an individual who, in the
course of reviewing discovery documents, undertakes tasks that could otherwise
be performed entirely by a machine cannot be said to engage in the practice of
law." 69 This decision fueled further consideration around the role of a lawyer's
duty of technological competence and duty of confidentiality with regard to client
information and data. 70 In other words, the Lola case, and others like it, 71 shine a

light on the subtle ways that the use of artificial intelligence in the legal industry
pushes at the fabric of what society expects of law practice, lawyers, and the justice
system. The use of Al in the legal industry offers just one of many illustrations of
such challenges to society's core values.
Indeed, more generally, the constant collection, use, and sale of data to fuel Al,
and the changing nature of machine-human interaction quietly and subtly nudge the

61 R. Amani Smathers, "The 21st-Century T-Shaped Lawyer," (2014) Law Practice 32.
62 John McGinnis & Russel Pearce, The GreatDisruption(a 7).
63 See Ed Walters, "The Model Rules of Autonomous Conduct: Ethical Responsibilities of Lawyers and
Artificial Intelligence" (2019) 35:4 GeorgiaState University Law Review 1073.
64 Michele DeStefano, "Compliance and Claim Funding: Testing the Borders of Lawyers' Monopoly and
the Unauthorized Practice of Law" (2014) 82 FordhamLaw Review 2961, 2961.
65 See Drew Simshaw, "Ethical Issues in Robo-Lawyering: The Need for Guidance on Developing and
Using Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law" (2018) 70:1 HastingsLaw Journal 173.
66 See Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 620 F. App'x 37, 45 (2d Cir. 2015) (hanging
the determination of whether contract attorneys are entitled to overtime pay on the question of whether
the artificial intelligence system employed in document review engages in the practice of law).
67 Compl. 20-21, Lolav. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, No. 13-cv-5008, 2014 WL 4626228
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014).
68 Michael Simon et al., "Lola v. Skadden and the Automation of the Legal Profession" (n. 27), p. 243.
69 Lola, 620 F. App'x at 45.
70 See Ed Walters, The Model Rules ofAutonomous Conduct (n. 68); Drew Simshaw, EthicalIssues in
Robo-Lawyering (n. 70).

71 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W. 2d 749 (Wis. 2016), cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017).
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fabric of our common vision of a just society. The contributors in this volume call
for increased examination and critical assessment of the implications of Al for a
just society. In particular, the contributors to this Special Issue propose legal frameworks that force us to confront the key question of whether the core values in an
AI-dependent society are the core values that should be embraced by a just society.

IV.

Fairness and Bias in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Over the last several years, Al and other emerging technologies have contributed
to a fundamental shift in the financial market ecosystem, creating a new class of
financial institutions-fintech firms. 72 "Fintech" is a catch-all term used to refer to
the digital platform or internet-based financial services firms that engage in digital transfers, storage, payments systems, digital asset origination (such as cryp-

tocurrency) and secondary market trading, investment advising and digital credit
scoring and origination. To capitalize on economic efficiencies, reduce transaction

costs and mitigate commonly-identified enterprise risks, fintech firms integrate Al
or distributed ledger technologies into their business models. While the inclusion
of data crunching algorithms in finance is nothing new-investment banking firms,

for example, have long relied on sophisticated algorithms to predict timing, pricing,
risk, and other factors that influence investment and trading decisions-the rapid
adoption of learning algorithms that interpret alternative data in consumer credit
markets presents significant risks. 73
Three contributions in this volume focus expressly on questions arising as a
result of the integration of Al in finance. In addition to these contributions, celebrated scholars increasingly interrogate these claims. 74 Specifically, supplementing traditional credit underwriting data inputs and processes, fintech firms employ
newer modeling techniques and consider a broader range of source data including
alternative data. These new inputs include information regarding consumers' financial transactions, recurring payments history and a behavioral score based on social
networking and digital-interface.

According to proponents, the development of nascent methodologies and alternative data enables fintech firms to expand access to credit to consumers historically
deemed invisible or unscorable. Further, proponents contend that removing human
underwriting agents and their biases reduces the likelihood of intentional discrimination. AI-based credit scoring methodologies may enhance consumer default predictions and lead to better credit classification and possibly lower-priced credit than

72 The discussion presented here appears in forthcoming academic journal manuscripts.
73 Christopher K. Odinet, "Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending" (2018) 69:4 Alabama Law Review
781; Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society (Boston: Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2015).
74 Federal Trade Commission, Big Data: A Tool For Inclusion Or Exclusion? (6 January 2016), p. i.

<https://www.ftc.gov/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues-ftc-report>
(visited 11 October 2021).
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traditional credit scoring methodologies. Together these process-oriented improvements enhance efficiency and accuracy, improve pricing, reduce operating and

loan origination costs and enable fintech firms to offer credit to a greater diversity
of consumers, in particular those who have struggled to obtain credit. Ultimately,
proponents argue that alternative data may assist historically marginalized (credit
invisible and unscorable consumers) to gain access to conventional credit markets.
Beyond simply browsing preferences, fintech firms are also integrating highly-personalized reputational data. For example, fintech firms are assessing consumers'
social network status, screen-scraping data from consumers' financial transactions
and social media activities and ranking consumers based on relational social connections (consumers' status as "social influencers") through analysis of exchanged
messages and friends tagged in social media posted photos.
The fintech trend in using Al and alternative data sources to make credit decisions highlights some of the core fairness and bias concerns raised by the pervasive
use of Al. What is the basis and have we determined the accuracy of claims that Al
will reduce human bias in decision-making? When Al attempts to mitigate bias in
traditional sources of data, what steps should be taken to ensure new and additional
data do not merely replicate old, historic patterns of discrimination? Do existing
laws enable those harmed by AI-powered inequity or discrimination to obtain a sufficient remedy or deter further harm? How would a consumer even assess whether
to trust new AI-powered services? The contributors to this Special Issue contribute
to a dialogue seeking to answer these and other related core questions about the
implications of Al for a just society.

V.

Outline of the Special Issue

This Special Issue asks whether and how more pervasive use of Al in business,
government, and the private sphere threatens to cabin or reshape the core values
considered foundational to a just society. Contributors confront key questions
about the impact of Al, including: How might the risk of harm from AI-bias be mitigated? Is it possible to obtain better data to fuel Al without subjecting data subjects
to deeper loss of privacy and more extensive surveillance? Should law shape the
design of Al so as to reduce the type and severity of harm caused by the changing
nature of machine-human interaction? Should the power of Al be harnessed for
good, or will the realities of technological design tradeoffs force society to loosen
its expectations for equity and ethics?
Jeffrey Ritter starts the Special Issue with "Digital Justice in 2058: Trusting

Our Survival to Al, Quantum and the Rule of Law". Ritter challenges law-makers,
legal reformers, and legal scholars to work with technologists to address fundamental societal challenges raised by the increasing use of Al within a global society.
Ritter uses current developments in quantum computing to imagine a future where

rule of law transforms into AI-dominated quantum law. Doing so brings to life the
questions at the core of this volume-how to ensure human-centric values for a just
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society remain central to the rule of law in an increasingly technology-dominant
age. Reinforcing the meaning of justice in an AI-dominated world, Ritter argues,

will require fundamentally shifting the analytical approach that currently dominates law and technology discussions. Instead of trying to bend technology to fit
existing legal systems, an approach that seems to fail to provide just outcomes at
nearly every turn, Ritter's approach would start from within the technology infrastructure. Indeed, Ritter argues that integrating the rule of law and the meaning of
justice into the very technological infrastructure of Al systems may be the only way
to future proof our AI-enhanced society against erosion of the rule of law.
Several contributors answer Ritter's call for new analytical approaches
to law and technology discussions in the realm of privacy, surveillance, and
human-machine interaction. First, Dr. Jasmine McNealy's "Hoarder, Handler, Bri-

coleur, Spy: An Explication of Information Distribution Organizations", in which
she uses information processing theory to propose a categorization of information

distribution organizations as a tool for making policy decisions about how such
organizations create, use, and store data. Dr. McNealy uses an interdisciplinary

methodology to construct this policy evaluation tool-applying information processing theory to understand caselaw in both the United States and the European
Union, and finding that the cases hinged on the way the organizations handle data.
She ultimately finds four categories of information distribution organizations:
hoarders, handlers, bricoleurs, and spies. Hoarders are organizations which collect and store information to license its use by other organizations. Handlers aim
to help the transfer of information to make this information accessible to others.
They are not concerned with informing others about the content of the information, but with providing access. Bricoleurs create information from other sources
for the sake of increasing knowledge about a subject. Finally, spy organizations
collect information to use for other purposes without the owner of the information
understanding the nature of the collection and use. Dr. McNealy uses this categorization to shine light on organizational motivations for collecting and using data,
and argues that such insight should be used to evaluate which privileges to grant
such organizations, and when to restrict data access and use via regulation in the
future.

Dr. Qureshi and her co-authors introduce questions regarding the integration of
Al in financial technology ("fintech"). In "(Dis)crediting Financial Inclusion: The
Integration of Artificial Intelligence In Consumer Credit Markets In The United
States And Kenya", Qureshi and her co-authors evaluate the rapid adoption of Al
intended to integrate vulnerable individuals who enter into "short term" financially
disadvantageous credit arrangements to overcome situations of financial distress.
Focusing on MPESA - a Kenyan money transfer platform that has enabled millions of unbanked Kenyans to facilitate personal and commercial financial transactions - their contribution acknowledges the transformative power of technology
platforms and the potential for these platforms to significantly alter points of access
to financial markets. Bypassing the paper trail, brick-and-mortar structures, and
human agent focused tools of legacy financial institutions, fintech firms answer the
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call for less expensive, faster, and more accessible payment, mobile banking, and
credit services. Citing the 33 million unbanked and underbanked households in the
United States as a fraction of the nearly two billion individuals and families globally who lack access to financial services (a group disproportionately composed of
women and people of color), Qureshi and her co-authors applaud those committed
to the incorporating the millions of underserved individuals who have historically
been excluded. As this Essay emphasizes and the co-authors' contribution notes,
there are noteworthy costs associated with these gains.
"(Dis)crediting Financial Inclusion" deconstructs some of the costs touted by
enraptured enthusiasts of fintech firms and contends that the efficacy of mobile
money and micro-lending or alternative credit scoring-cannot be assumed.
Rather, Qureshi and her coauthors argue, fintechs must generate evidence that their
practices are not, in fact, simply rewriting the terms of financial exclusion in their
outcomes through an alternative means.
The contributions related to bias and discrimination also pick up Ritter's call
for re-examining prior regulatory and policy assumptions at the intersection of

artificial intelligence and the law-first by considering new paradigms through
which to consider ethics and regulation, and second by emphasizing the particularly pernicious role algorithmic discrimination plays for persons with disabilities.
Emile Loza de Silles considers the potential integration of technical standards
requiring anti-discrimination and anti-bias by design with law, asking whether
law can pull both the technical design and the human uses of artificial intelligence
toward justice. Loza de Silles sees an opportunity to capitalize on the growing

consensus in the technical community through contract and regulatory requirements to reduce or eliminate bias and discrimination as a technical matter. This,
she distinguishes from the problem of discrimination and bias in organizational
artificial intelligence governance. Ultimately, Loza de Silles calls on law makers
to consider the development and integration of technical anti-bias standards as a
model on which to consider building legislation to combat human uses of artificial
intelligence for biased and discriminatory purposes. Ultimately, Loza de Silles
remains hopeful that the law can "help to bend the moral arc of artificial intelligence toward justice."
Sebastian Benthall and Salome Viljoen consider whether borrowing principles
from financial market regulation can open a new paradigm for data governance.
Benthall and Viljoen argue that a parallel can be drawn between the functioning of
financial markets and of data markets. In particular, the authors point out that financial and data markets deal with assets that share certain relevant features. Namely,
both securitized financial assets and data assets derive their social value from how
they relate to other individual assets; both may generate systemic risk; and both
generate value in highly complex networks, whose full workings are obscured to
most actors involved. As a result, Benthall and Viljoen argue that the tools used
by financial regulators to augment the protections given to individual investors
via private agreements may serve as important tools for heightened consumer pri-

vacy protection in data markets. Indeed, the authors call for heightened urgency
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in providing greater measures of privacy protection because, in their view, strong

privacy and data protection amounts to a new way of mitigating financial risk.
Jennifer Chapman considers the role of regulation in curbing discrimination
in the provision of fintech services. Chapman evaluates the social justice and ethical issues relating to fintechs and the services they provide to consumers. Fintechs can help consumers by increasing access to banking services and lowering
prices. However, they can also reinforce discrimination based protected classes
such as race and gender through the use of Al which is scarcely regulated because
of a perception that Al data use is neutral. In addition, fintechs can more easily
use unfair and predatory lending practices due to less strict regulation schemes
as regulatory bodies are unsure of how to govern these new companies. In light
of both the regulatory regime in the U.S. and international banking and fintech
regulations, Chapman argues that for the U.S. to mitigate the risk posed by fintech
services, the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and state regulatory
bodies should be more collaborative in their approach to regulating fintechs. Doing
so would, Chapman argues, protect consumers, promote innovation, and preserve
state sovereignty.

Meanwhile, Nizan Packin directs attention to a population often overlooked in
the policy and scholarly discussions on artificial intelligence, discrimination, and
bias: persons with disabilities. Packin examines the threat that artificial intelligence
may entrench and enhance discrimination against persons with disabilities. In order
for artificial intelligence to deliver on its promise to enable more inclusive online
and physical spaces, and expand access for persons with disabilities to a variety of
domains previously reserved for the able, Packin argues for the inclusion of persons
with disabilities at the artificial intelligence design stage. Packin theorizes such
inclusion at the design stage as an ethical issue. Packin points out that the design of
artificial intelligence, including the design of the ethical principles guiding artificial intelligence, reflect the assumptions, ethical priorities, and moral judgments of
those that designed the artificial intelligence. In theorizing the inclusion of persons
with disabilities at the design stage as an ethical issue, Packin's contribution to the
Special Issue stands as a call to her fellow contributors and the scholarly community broadly to consider the assumptions underlying the frameworks, policies, and
regulatory frameworks proposed in light of the relative inclusivity of disadvantaged groups in the methodology used to arrive at those frameworks.
Finally, in "Are There International Rules Governing Cyberspace?",
Dr. Guiguo Wang examines the role of international law in regulating cyberspace.
In many ways, his exploration of cyberspace-an open universe that operates

across-borders-serves as a capstone for the Special Issue. Unlike the other contributions that focus on the law of a single jurisdiction or compare the laws of
different jurisdiction, Dr. Wang situates discussion of the backdrop for Al and other
technologies in cyberspace and notes that, while the UN has adopted resolutions
calling for using cyberspace in accordance with the UN Charter and set up a government expert group to deal with cyberspace issues, there is no consensus regarding international regulations for cyberspace.
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As Dr. Wang notes, the rapid integration of cyberspace into our lives necessitates regulation of its operation. In his contribution. Dr. Wang emphasizes that UN
expert group's reports and underscores its conclusion that agreements reached by

states at regional and bilateral level, customary international law and existing rules
of international organizations such as the WTO constitute a body of cyberspace
governance rules. International accord regarding cyberspace regulation across bor-

ders, however, remains elusive and illustrates another frontier that necessitates a
governance solution.

VI.

Conclusion

Ultimately, this Special Issue calls for heightened scrutiny of the relationship
between law and Al. The contributors explore the extent to which the societal values that underpin core legal doctrines have shifted to accommodate the expansion
of AI-powered tools into nearly every area of society. In doing so, the contributors
call upon the legal system to consider whether and how it can mitigate these shifts
until society can critically investigate and collectively consider whether the current
trajectory of Al benefits justice or detracts from it. Throughout the Special Issue,
the contributors make clear that those benefiting from AI-powered tools are not
always those that technology companies promise will receive the benefit. The contributors also make clear that even in the circumstances in which the benefits of an
Al use case line up with values of justice, inclusion, and equity, dangers continue
to lurk. The Special Issue shines a light on the trade-offs inherent in expanding the
reach of Al in society-every benefit comes at a price.
This Special Issue seeks to contribute to an evaluation of whether the benefits
of Al are worth that price. Some of the authors achieve this by offering new frameworks through which to better identify what benefits Al actually offers (as opposed
to what Al promises to offer) and to better identify the trade-offs required to realize
those benefits (Jeffrey Ritter, Jasmine McNealy, Kristin Johnson, Farah Qureshi,
Stephen Rea, Nizan Packin, and Guiguo Wang). Others offer paradigms for using

the law to navigate, mitigate, or redefine the trade-offs necessary to achieve the
societal benefits of Al (Emile Loza de Siles, Sebastian Benthall, Salome Viljoen,
and Jennifer Chapman). Ultimately, the Special Issue identifies both detrimental
and beneficial impacts of Al on society, and then offers new tools for navigating
those tensions in hopes of harnessing technology for good, rather than technology
mutating societal good into profit for a few.

